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d a r w i n i s m  i n  t h e  u n i t e d  s t a t e s : 
s c i e n c e ,  r e l i g i o n ,  a n d  l i t e r a t u r e
The scopes trial  that took place in 1925 at Dayton, Tennessee, has remained 
to this day one of the deﬁ ning events in the positioning of Darwinism on the 
American scene. Highly publicized at the time, and inscribed in popular cultural 
memory through the ﬁ lm Inherit the Wind (1960), the Scopes trial stages the U.S. 
encounter with Darwinism as a pervasive “image of confrontation between evo-
lutionism and religion,” setting an enlightened America that believes in the Con-
stitution and scientiﬁ c progress against a fundamentalist America that believes 
in the Bible.  Twenty- ﬁ rst- century research has shown that the engagement with 
evolutionary theory in the United States has been more complex than this dichoto-
mous opposition suggests; however, the coverage of the Scopes trial established an 
enduring framework for future representations of Darwinism.
The popular epithet for the events at Dayton, the “monkey trial,” points to one 
of the central questions raised by Darwin: his claim that human and nonhuman 
primates are genealogically related and that, consequently, the human species does 
not have a unique, separate status (I call this the “Darwinian narrative”). This 
contention has always, and everywhere, constituted the core of the popular fasci-
nation with Darwin’s theory, but in the United States this interest is intertwined 
in a peculiar way with religious fundamentalism and its insistence on the special 
creation of man. As Peter J. Bowler argues, however, evolutionary theory and 
Christian belief are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In Europe, Protestant as 
well as Catholic theologians, for example Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, have found 
ways to reconcile evolutionary theory with a liberal theology. The early reception 
of Darwinism in the United States, initially limited to academic debates, especially 
v i r g i n i a  r i c h t e r
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among theologians inﬂ uenced by German philological criticism of the Bible, was 
similarly accommodating. But in the early twentieth century, fundamentalism 
emerged as a widespread popular movement that postulated a literal belief in Gen-
esis and a concomitant repudiation of evolution.
The Darwinian question of  human- ape kinship has been taken up in two re-
cent novels, Sara Gruen’s Ape House and Benjamin Hale’s The Evolution of Bruno 
 Littlemore, which will be discussed below. While both novels emphasize, in very 
diﬀ erent ways, the inclusion of both humans and great apes in a single family 
of primates, they cannot quite escape the American tradition epitomized by the 
Scopes trial. Hale’s Bruno Littlemore tackles the confrontation between evolution 
and Christianity head on: in his novel, the sexual relationship between a woman 
and an ape—which results in a pregnancy—attracts the ire of Christian fun-
damentalists. The ape’s autobiography can be regarded as a speech act intended 
to oﬀ er a powerful counternarrative to the foundational tale of human superi-
ority. In Ape House, the conﬂ ict between religion and evolution is present only 
as an undercurrent. Christian fundamentalist opposition to Darwinism is not 
explicitly broached, but rather displaced onto a less radical, conservative posi-
tion: the celebration of intraspecies heterosexual reproduction and the exclusion 
of homosexuality. Gruen succeeds in reconciling two incompatible positions, the 
Darwinian narrative and the clean segregation of the species. In diﬀ erent ways, 
the clash of values staged at the Scopes trial continues to reverberate even in a 
cultural context that is informed by ecological concerns, feminism, and a critique 
of  anthropocentrism.
At Dayton’s monkey trial, the well- known lawyer Clarence Darrow presented 
a purely legal argumentation—the implications of the Tennessee Constitution 
for the teaching of science, no matter what its content—on behalf of the de-
fense; for the prosecution, William Jennings Bryan engaged in an epistemologi-
cal,  theological, and ethical critique of evolutionary theory as such. Two aspects 
of the science brought up by Bryan—Darwin’s conﬂ ict with the Bible, and the 
“hypothetical” nature of evolutionary theory—are of particular relevance here, 
the ﬁ rst because it brings us to the center of debates in the wake of Darwinism, 
the second because of its implicit importance for textual studies. As Bryan claimed 
in the ﬁ rst place, Darwin’s proposition that all mammals, and speciﬁ cally humans 
and apes, are descended from a common ancestor undermines the biblical account 
of the separate creation of each species, and the divine establishment of man as 
apart from and above the natural world. The Darwinian deposing of anthropo-
centrism entails, Bryan believed, “a degradation of man” and, in consequence, 
atheism, social unrest, and the brutalization of humankind that had culminated 
in the First World War. As Jeﬀ rey P. Moran points out, Bryan had long held the 
belief that the Darwinian “struggle for existence” constituted an endorsement of 
warfare in general, and that German militarism in particular had been shaped 
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by the inﬂ uence of Darwin and his German follower Friedrich Nietzsche. Such 
concerns about the negative social eﬀ ects of Darwinism were not unique to the 
United States; in Europe, they were linked to a sociomedical discourse on de-
generation. In this discourse, religion, as an institution in charge of moral in-
struction and control, played a role as a socially stabilizing factor counteracting 
the negative inﬂ uences of modern life; however, the vested interest in a literal 
interpretation of the  Bible  constitutes a deﬁ ning factor of a speciﬁ cally American 
anti- evolutionism.
Bryan’s second objection to the teaching of evolution was that evolutionary 
theory was a mere hypothesis, unproven by empirical fact or scientiﬁ c demonstra-
tion: “There is no more reason to believe that man descended from some inferior 
animal than there is to believe that a stately mansion has descended from a small 
cottage. Resemblances are not proof—they simply put us on inquiry. As one fact, 
such as the absence of the accused from the scene of the murder, outweighs all the 
resemblances that a thousand witnesses could swear to, so the inability of science 
to trace any one of the millions of species to another species outweighs all the 
resemblances upon which evolutionists rely to establish man’s blood relationship 
with the brutes” (“Summation,” 42). Unlike the law of gravity, which every lay-
person can test by ocular proof (drop an apple and see what happens), evolution is 
not testable within a strictly empirical epistemology, that is, by direct observation. 
As Bryan maintained, “the wisest scientists” have not been able to place evolution 
at the scene of the murder, so to speak, whereas a “law” that is antithetical to the 
principle of natural selection (and its unpredictable outcome) is as evident to “any 
child” as is Newton’s law of gravity: “a spiritual gravitation that draws all souls 
toward heaven” (ibid.). By insisting on the general upward gravitation of creation, 
Bryan attempted to defend the notion of a designed and ordered nature as the basis 
of an unchanging social order—indicated by the metaphor of similarly unchang-
ing mansions and cottages—and, in the context of the American South, of racial 
separation. The individual creation of each species and the dominion of (white) 
men over nature are key features of this worldview.
As became evident at the trial, Bryan’s grasp of evolutionary theory was ﬂ awed 
by his ignorance of the latest developments in various disciplines that supported 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, for example the discovery of early hominid fos-
sils, which contributed to closing one of the most conspicuous gaps in Darwin’s 
argumentation, and, more important, the work that had been going on in genet-
ics since the turn of the century, which was to contribute to the evolutionary syn-
thesis in the 1930s and 1940s. Evolution was a “hypothesis”—in the sense of “not 
proven”—only within an epistemology that was already obsolete at the time of 
the trial. However, by harping on the improvability of evolutionary theory, Bryan 
was unwittingly responding to an aspect that Darwin did not fail to emphasize 
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himself: the preliminary, inchoate nature of the chain of evidence presented in On 
the Origin of Species.
Far from being a weakness in Darwin’s argumentation, his strategic rhetori-
cal modesty, together with the empirical richness of Origin (the many examples 
accumulated over more than twenty years), contributed to the swift acceptance 
of his theory despite various gaps in the scientiﬁ c knowledge of his time. One 
of Darwin’s most important frames of reference, domestic breeding or “artiﬁ cial 
selection,” provided an analogy that only went so far: breeding produces variation 
within a species, from chihuahuas to St. Bernards, but not entirely new species. 
The mechanism of inheritance was as yet unknown; the signiﬁ cance of Gregor 
Mendel’s experiments on plant hybridization, while carried out in Darwin’s life-
time, was only recognized in the early twentieth century. However, Darwin was 
not only aware of these gaps, he was ready to point them out. In addition, he 
sought authority by uniting scientiﬁ c methods of inquiry with methodologies and 
rhetorical strategies derived from the humanities, thereby transforming the epis-
temological foundations of his ﬁ eld from an inductive natural history to a science 
based on abduction (a term coined by Charles Sanders Peirce): the development 
of probabilistic scenarios, or “thought experiments,” which are then subjected to 
further testing.
As David Amigoni has argued, Darwin succeeded in establishing credibility for 
his theory by aligning his own methodology with the textual methods developed in 
philology, in other words through a double aﬃ  liation with the literary ﬁ eld. First, 
“Darwin’s rhetorical strategy draws its persuasive power from the cultural author-
ity associated with linguistic and literary knowledge,” that is, Darwin sought the 
prestige of these established disciplines for his own emerging ﬁ eld—as did other 
groundbreaking naturalists before him, such as Charles Lyell, who bolstered the 
authority of his Principles of Geology (1830–33) by numerous references to the clas-
sics. Second, by choosing the traditional metaphor of the “book of nature” as his 
operative trope, but giving it a particular twist—the book of nature is fragmented 
and therefore only readable if carefully deciphered and reconstructed—Darwin 
could point out the methodological parallels between philological criticism (which 
generated a view of the Bible as a historical document), the principles of modern 
geology (uniformitarianism, actualism, and a  steady- state view of the earth) estab-
lished by Lyell (which not only showed that the earth was much older than the 
Bible suggested, but which also provided the foundations for Darwin’s own work 
in biology), and his own reﬂ ections on the mutability of species. Darwin posited 
a basic analogy between linguistic change and the transmutation of species. In 
consequence of this analogy between philology—which could infer, on the basis 
of the similarities between living languages, a vanished “common ancestor,” for in-
stance the Indo- European language—and biology, which in Darwin’s hands could 
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similarly postulate a “missing link” connecting two extant species, the imperfec-
tion of the fossil record was turned from an obstacle to, almost, a conﬁ rmation of 
evolutionary theory: “Thus a complex understanding of ‘literature’ consisting of 
historically descended and interrelated linguistic traditions, as well as the book as 
an organic object in history, helped Darwin to mount the positive argument for 
the fragmentary evidence of evolutionary change.”
In addition to Darwin’s rhetorical strategy of self- authorization and the meth-
odological aﬃ  nity between philology and evolutionary theory, there is a third 
instance in which Darwinism is aligned with the literary ﬁ eld: the thought experi-
ment. George Levine deﬁ nes “thought experiments” as “probabilistic stories” that 
play a crucial role in Darwin’s argumentation in Origin. Whereas in the process 
of institutionalizing scientiﬁ c disciplines and establishing good scientiﬁ c practices 
that took place in the nineteenth century, the lab experiment emerged in the 
natural sciences as the privileged practice to diﬀ erentiate—and exclude—“non- 
knowledge” from knowledge, the literary technique of the thought experiment 
acquired a new relevance in the non- experimental sciences. Because of Darwin’s 
ample usage of thought experiments as an epistemological practice, Darwinism 
currently is of particular interest to the newly emergent ﬁ eld of “agnotology” or 
“nescience,” which is connected mostly to the history of science and historical 
epistemology but also to research in the humanities. Robert N. Proctor and Londa 
Schiebinger deﬁ ne the ﬁ eld as “the study of ignorance making, the lost and the 
forgotten.” Ignorance, they suggest, doesn’t just happen; it is the result of pro-
cesses of evaluation and exclusion, ev n of conscious suppression. In the context 
of German studies and the history of science at some Swiss and German univer-
sities and research centers, however, related research has developed a speciﬁ c 
focus on nescience and literature that aims at establishing “non- knowledge” as 
a productive force, as opposed to the absence of knowledge, which is perceived 
as loss,  misinformation, or censorship. Instead, nescience is closely connected 
to  curiosity and wonder and consequently forms a precondition for scientiﬁ c 
 inquiry.
The literary scholar Michael Gamper has elucidated the links between the 
marked “non- knowledge” in Darwin’s writing and Darwin’s use of “speculative” 
and “literary” techniques, which resulted in transforming a scientiﬁ c ﬁ eld— 
evolutionary theory—into a rich cultural archive that brought forth numerous 
creative responses. From the beginning, the debate on Darwin’s theory took place 
in popular ﬁ ction and visual representations as well as in academic texts, and this 
has to do with the form of Darwin’s argument and with its provocative content. 
Since Darwin’s central hypotheses could not be observed in nature, his theory for-
mation, according to Gamper, by necessity contained speculative elements. How-
ever, Darwin succeeded in turning this epistemological weakness into a strength:
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Being able to recognize the similarities between seemingly unconnected phenomena 
and to produce series of comparable circumstantial evidence within the immense 
material archive of natural history of his time were the strengths Darwin played 
out in his books, and with which he responded to the speciﬁ cs of his own science: 
namely to the fact that it operated not only in space but particularly in time, that it 
worked historically rather than experimentally and that it was concerned with pro-
cesses which eluded direct observation. To do this required a great deal of imagina-
tive creativity on the level of mental capacities; on the level of linguistic representa-
tion, however, it needed metaphor, analogy, and narrative.
As studies from Gillian Beer’s seminal Darwin’s Plots  to George Levine’s Dar-
win the Writer have shown, Darwin’s writing was highly literary—inseparably 
linking empirical observation with imagination, description with narrative, and 
serialization with anecdote and metaphor—and thereby provided many points 
of departure for ﬁ ctional engagements with evolutionary theory, a creative rep-
ertoire that has lost nothing of its productive potential ever since. Arguably, the 
uncertainty or non- knowledge constitutive of Darwinian evolutionary theory 
contributed to generating narratives about what Thomas Henry Huxley called 
the “question of questions for mankind”: “the ascertainment of the place which 
Man occupies in nature and of his relations to the universe of things.” More 
speciﬁ cally, the Darwinian narrative of changing species and  human- simian kin-
ship invited the production of literary thought experiments such as H. G. Wells’s 
scientiﬁ c romances: ﬁ ctional explorations of the potential of evolutionary theory 
when pushed to its imaginative limits.
In contemporary American ﬁ ction, apes are quite a topos, making their appear-
ance in various works from Michael Crichton’s science ﬁ ction novel Congo (1980), 
in which the gorilla, Amy, trained in sign language, serves as a mediator between 
a group of American explorers and murderous mutant gorillas in the African rain 
forests, through Bernard Malamud’s dystopian fantasy God’s Grace (1982), featur-
ing a lonely human survivor of a thermonuclear disaster who tries—and fails—to 
restart creation with a group of apes, to Daniel Quinn’s philosophical novel Ish-
mael: An Adventure of the Mind and Spirit (1992), in which a wise gorilla discusses 
ethical questions with a human pupil. Widely diﬀ erent in generic aﬃ  liation, 
aesthetic sensibility, and moral seriousness, these novels use the speaking ape as a 
ﬁ gure of interspecies mediation, but conversely also to mark the ultimate diﬀ er-
ence between human and nonhuman primates.
Two recent ape novels, Sara Gruen’s Ape House (2010) and Benjamin Hale’s The 
Evolution of Bruno Littlemore (2011), diﬀ er in various ways from their predeces-
sors published in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast to the exotic settings of Congo 
and God’s Grace (Ishmael is set in New York), Gruen and Hale choose speciﬁ -
cally contemporary, American settings (Kansas City, Philadelphia, and Los An-
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geles in Ape House, Chicago and New York in Bruno Littlemore). While Gruen 
and Hale use their ape ﬁ gures to criticize various aspects of the American way of 
life— consumerism, the lack of sustainability, the cruelty to animals in industrial-
ized research, and the voyeurism of mass media—they do not share Malamud’s, 
Quinn’s, and Crichton’s interest in a larger dystopian vision. Rather, their focus 
is domestic, geared to the family and interpersonal relations (persons, nota bene, 
including apes). Another signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence from God’s Grace and Ishmael (but 
not from Congo) is the choice of women primatologists—in both cases, young, 
beautiful, blonde, and of junior standing as scientists—as the main participants in 
the  human- simian encounter, reﬂ ecting the prominent role of women in primatol-
ogy and their supposedly more empathetic approach to their objects of study. Both 
novels juxtapose caring women scientists, specializing in ape language acquisition 
and social behavior, with “hardcore” male biologists, who do not shrink from 
harmful animal experiments. Another diﬀ erence is that these women primatolo-
gists’ simian counterparts are not gorillas, whether wise or murderous, but chim-
panzees (in Bruno Littlemore) and bonobos (in Ape House).
Human- simian communication is a central issue negotiated in both novels. 
Various experiments conducted since the 1960s on chimpanzees’ and gorillas’ ca-
pacity to acquire American Sign Language have generated discussions about ape 
intelligence and about  human- ape similarities and diﬀ erences. The contested 
outcomes of these experiments open up a productive space of uncertainty and 
non- knowledge that is ﬁ lled by literary texts. Fiction can explore thought experi-
ments in which apes not only master asl and communicate via computers (Ape 
House), but even achieve vocal articulate language and, in fact, become  ﬁ rst- person 
narrators of their own life stories (Bruno Littlemore). While novels such as Ape 
House and The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore confer personhood on their non-
human agents, it is still questionable whether they succeed in “confronting the 
problem of nonhuman others,” as demanded by Cary Wolfe, a leading propo-
nent of posthumanism. According to Wolfe, the aims of posthumanist theory 
consist of, ﬁ rst, analyzing and countermanding the pervasive privileging of “the 
human” in Western philosophy (“speciesism”), and second, stressing the inextri-
cable  embodiment—the animal, evolutionary roots—of humans as well as their 
embeddedness in and subservience to a material, technological, and informational 
environment (Rites, 5–6). It is this shared creatureliness of humans and animals 
that constitutes the ethical basis of posthumanism: “the fundamental ethical bond 
we have with nonhuman animals resides in our shared ﬁ nitude, our vulnerability 
and mortality as ‘fellow creatures.’”
Despite their pro- ape stance, Gruen’s and Hale’s novels comply with these 
posthumanist objectives only partly at best. By giving their chimpanzee and 
bonobo protagonists the ability to speak—whether using articulate speech or sign 
 language—both novels suggest that personhood, with its attendant rights, is not a 
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human prerogative; but they achieve this at the price of anthropomorphizing the 
animals. This is, generally speaking, the formula of contemporary ape ﬁ ction. Few 
if any novels with simian protagonists show an interest in exploring the phenom-
enological diﬀ erences—for instance, the diﬀ erence in sense perception—between 
humans and apes. By representing their simian protagonists as deserving of con-
sideration because they are so similar to humans, Gruen’s and Hale’s novels remain 
vulnerable to the charge of speciesism. On the other hand, they indicate that in 
contemporary culture it is no longer possible to construe the human as an entity 
that can transcend its animality and materiality. However, the move that both nov-
els make to highlight the embodied state of the human is itself problematic, as I 
discuss below: in both cases, it is the female body—traditionally conceptualized as 
closer to nature than the male—whose material, biological condition is marked out.
Although Ape House and The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore manifest various 
similarities on the levels of plot, types of protagonist, and genre—both combine 
elements of the Freudian family romance with that of a romance proper—they 
are vastly diﬀ erent in the eﬀ ects they achieve with these materials. Ape House is 
committed aesthetically and semantically to realist representation, whereas Bruno 
Littlemore embraces the tendencies of postmodern literature. These divergent aes-
thetic commitments are mirrored in the diegetic representations of the apes’ re-
spective language use. While Gruen’s bonobos employ their language skills in a way 
that is presented as unproblematic—they succeed in unequivocally bringing across 
their meaning, at least to those who are willing to look for it—Bruno’s autobiog-
raphy is more interested in the deferral of meaning: it is self- referential, digressive, 
and full of intertextual references. This stylistic postmodernism is accompanied on 
the semantic level by ostentatious displays of sexual transgression, including ho-
mosexuality and bestiality. The interaction between humans and bonobos in Ape 
House, in contrast, remains carefully sanitized even while it is represented through 
the trope of the family (in the Freudian view, a highly sexualized space). Sexuality 
in Ape House is delimited by species boundaries. Moreover, while the bonobos, a 
species that has become famous for its high level of sexual behavior, represent an 
alternative society remarkably free from repression, human sexual relations in the 
novel do not transgress the conventions of heteronormativity.
l a n g u a g e  a n d  s e x u a l i t y  i n  A P E  H O U S E
In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin asserts that “man is descended from some 
lower form, notwithstanding that  connecting- links have not hitherto been discov-
ered,” thus stating explicitly what was only implied in On the Origin of Species. 
Even more radically, he includes the “higher faculties,” such as abstract reasoning, 
the aesthetic sense, and the ability to communicate, into the evolutionary narrative. 
In contradistinction to Thomas Henry Huxley who, as a comparative anatomist, 
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asserted the physical continuity of humans with other species but claimed that 
“the vastness of the gulf between civilized man and the brutes” was constituted 
by uniquely human mental capacities, Darwin only saw a diﬀ erence of degree. In 
particular, Huxley reserved the traditional Cartesian diﬀ erence marker, “the mar-
vellous endowment of intelligible and rational speech,” for the human species; in 
consequence, man is the only living being capable of passing on his accumulated 
experience from one generation to the next and, therefore, of producing culture. In 
contrast, Darwin postulated that articulate speech had developed out of gestures 
and vocalizations, which in turn were connected to emotions shared by humans 
and animals. In other words, human language clearly has roots in an animal na-
ture common to all species: “The habitual use of articulate language is, however, 
peculiar to man; but he uses, in common with the lower animals, inarticulate cries 
to express his meaning, aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the 
face. This especially holds good with the more simple and vivid feelings, which are 
but little connected with our higher intelligence. Our cries of pain, fear, surprise, 
anger, together with their appropriate actions, and the murmur of a mother to her 
beloved child, are more expressive than any words” (Descent, 88).
Language is not a “gift” uniquely bestowed on humans. Rather, it has a biologi-
cal basis and has evolved according to the laws of natural selection: “no philologist 
now supposes that any language has been deliberately invented; it has been slowly 
and unconsciously developed by many steps” (Descent, 89). The ﬁ rst steps were 
initiated in human prehistory and have analogies in animal means of communi-
cation; for example, Darwin compares the interplay between babies’ “instinctive 
tendency to speak” (ibid.) and the active (cultural) acquisition of language with 
birdsong, which in each species is similarly universal and instinctive while show-
ing regional variations. In addition to the close connection of “inarticulate cries” 
and gestures with the emotions, the ability to imitate—to “ape”—shared by all 
primates is for Darwin the key to the evolutionary emergence of language.
Darwin’s reﬂ ections on language are, like many of his other tenets, backed up 
by thought experiments compounded with observations (by Darwin himself or 
one of the many naturalists with whom he corresponded) and speculative infer-
ences: “Since monkeys certainly understand much that is said to them by man, 
and when wild, utter  signal- cries of danger to their fellows . . . , may not some 
unusually wise ape- like animal have imitated the growl of a beast of prey, and 
thus told his  fellow- monkeys the nature of the expected danger? This would have 
been the ﬁ rst step in the formation of language” (Descent, 90). The subjunctive 
marks the hypothetical nature of the thought experiment at this stage of his theory 
formation. Fiction, by deﬁ nition written in an “as if ” mode, is a medium that can 
develop scientiﬁ c thought experiments into larger, coherent narratives. In Darwin’s 
lifetime, various writers of ﬁ ction explored the implications of evolution not only 
for the future of humankind, but also for its past.
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Since Wolfgang Köhler’s behavioral experiments in which he was able to show 
that chimpanzees have the capacity to deliberate and to solve problems (The Men-
tality of Apes [1917]), research into apes’ cognitive and communicative abilities has 
been extensive, culminating in attempts to teach gorillas and chimpanzees to com-
municate (with humans and with each other) via asl or other means. However, 
the evaluation of such experiments, and of the research conducted by linguists, 
anthropologists, and primatologists, is highly contested. There is no agreement 
among experts on the related questions of simian “speech” and “animal culture.” To 
take one prominent position: Michael Tomasello, the director of the Max Planck 
Institute of Evolutionary Psychology at Leipzig, bases his claim that human com-
munication emerged out of gestures rather than vocalization on his work with 
nonhuman primates: the vocalizations of great apes are genetically ﬁ xed whereas 
gestures are learned and can be used ﬂ exibly. This suggests that there is continuity 
between simian and human modes of communication, just as Darwin maintained. 
However, while apes have the ability for intentional communication, according to 
Tomasello they lack cooperative communication, that is, they do not share with 
humans “prosocial intention” or altruism. In other words, for Tomasello altruism 
and cooperation do not only constitute the basis for human communication but, 
speciﬁ cally, they are what distinguishes human from simian interaction: ape com-
munication is based on individual practical reasoning, human communication on 
cooperative reasoning. Shared intentionality is something that other species lack: 
“This fundamentally cooperative process makes human communication utterly 
diﬀ erent from the communicative activities of all other species on the planet.”
This insistence on human uniqueness, albeit in a single circumscribed sector, is 
contested by the primatologist Frans de Waal and other advocates of animal cul-
ture, who stress “the similarities of animal traditions to human culture, focusing 
on common characteristics, such as behavioural variation underpinned by social 
learning,  group- speciﬁ c repertoires, or the diﬀ usion of innovations.” My point 
here is twofold: ﬁ rst, even for the proponents of animal culture and critics of an-
thropocentrism, humankind continues to provide the benchmarks other species 
have to meet. Second, the ﬁ eld of inquiry opened by Darwin has not been closed. 
The question of humans’ and apes’ relative status, and the epistemological and 
ethical consequences following from any conclusion, is still up for discussion. It is 
precisely this ultimate undecidability that opens up a productive space for literary 
thought experiments about speaking apes.
Ape language acquisition is one of the interests shared by Sara Gruen’s and Ben-
jamin Hale’s novels. In these works,  human- simian communication is explored in 
various settings of animal research and display, such as a behavioral studies lab, a 
zoo, a theatrical performance, and reality tv. One crucial diﬀ erence between the 
two novels is their choice of narrative structure. Ape House is narrated from an 
external vantage point without a personalized narrator, and the focalization shifts 
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between various ﬁ gures: the two main protagonists, the journalist John Thigpen 
and the primatologist Isabel Duncan, and the group of bonobos who constitute 
the novel’s center of interest. In The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore, in contrast, we 
ﬁ nd an embodied  ﬁ rst- person narrator and internal focalization; the story is told 
by the eponymous hero, an articulate chimpanzee who dictates his memoirs to a 
human amanuensis. These decisions on narrative presentation have consequences 
for the diﬀ erent literary thought experiments on ape language acquisition. While 
both novels aﬃ  rm that apes have language, in Bruno Littlemore this is performed 
and commented on by the speaking ape himself, whose eﬀ ectively human status 
is thus spectacularly displayed.
Whereas we follow Bruno’s process of language acquisition and acculturation 
step by step, in Ape House the bonobos are presented from the beginning as accom-
plished users of asl and specially designed computers. Apes’ linguistic capacity is 
therefore not problematized; it is presented as a given. The absence of any discus-
sion of the possible limitations and diﬃ  culties of  human- ape communication im-
plies a concept of language that ignores the conditions of human communication 
that have been part of linguistics since Ferdinand de Saussure: that language is 
not expressive but constitutive of signiﬁ cance, that the sign is arbitrary, and that 
meaning is equivocal and endlessly deferred. In Ape House, language is transpar-
ent and untroubled; problems in understanding are either of a technical (some 
humans are not skilled in asl) or a psychological and ethical nature (some human 
interlocutors do not recognize the apes as valid subjects of communication). For 
John Thigpen, the assignment to write an article about the inhabitants of the 
Great Ape Language Lab in Kansas City results in a complete overthrow of his 
preconceived worldview: “He’d had a two- way conversation with great apes. He’d 
spoken to them in English, and they’d responded using American Sign Language, 
all the more remarkabl  because it meant they were competent in two human 
languages. . . . He’d looked into their eyes and recognized without a shadow of a 
doubt that sentient, intelligent beings were looking back. It was entirely diﬀ erent 
from peering into a zoo enclosure, and it changed his comprehension of the world 
in such a profound way he could not yet articulate it.” Because he meets them 
in an egalitarian environment—the lab is run on “non- coercive” principles, and 
the bonobos are actually consulted before visitors are allowed in—John is enabled 
to recognize their equality. His discovery that humans are not the only “sentient, 
intelligent beings” on earth results not only in a revision of his tacitly anthropo-
centric assumptions, but also in an examination of his own life. The encounter 
with the bonobos makes John aware that his private and professional lives have 
been directed by external interests to the detriment of his true values, such as 
journalistic integrity, on the one hand, and unreserved personal commitment, on 
the other hand.
The John Thigpen plot line can be described as a triple quest: for a restoration 
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of his professional integrity, for a restoration of his marriage, and for an acknowl-
edgment from the bonobos that reciprocates his own recognition of their person-
hood. This last aspect is exempliﬁ ed by a minor but pertinent episode: while John 
gets very friendly with the apes and perceives, to his surprise, “how distinct, how 
diﬀ erentiated, how almost human” (6) they are, he is not attentive enough to see 
that one of them, the young adult male Mbongi, is wearing a gorilla mask. John’s 
misapprehension results in Mbongi’s being oﬀ ended and declining to interact fur-
ther with the visitor, at which John in turn is left “feeling as if he’d slapped a baby” 
(ibid.). This breach is only healed in the novel’s ﬁ nal scene, when Mbongi accepts a 
piece of carrot cake brought by John, who by then has turned from a metaphorical 
baby- slapper to a  father- to- be as well as a pet keeper and a successful reporter on 
nature conservation projects. The bonobos function as catalysts for this process of 
renewal. The phrase that they are “almost human” is a giveaway, however, for the 
novel’s fundamentally undisturbed humanism, which coincides with its hetero-
normativity to the point of aﬃ  rming quite traditional “family values” even if the 
bourgeois family now includes nonhuman creatures.
It is signiﬁ cant that the apes in question are bonobos, the chimpanzees’ close 
relatives famed for their peacefulness and sexual activity. As the primatologist 
Christophe Boesch summarizes the research on populations living in the wild, 
the bonobo (Pan paniscus) has been portrayed “as overly sexual, with regular ho-
mosexual interactions between the females, and as exhibiting very cohesive social 
grouping patterns, with females dominant over males.” Chimpanzees (Pan trog-
lodytes), in contrast, are described as living in less- cohesive, smaller groups, with 
social males dominant over the females. In addition, as Jane Goodall’s research has 
shown, chimpanzees can exhibit intraspecies violence and even engage in “war-
fare” with neighboring populations, a type of behavior that certainly has caught 
the popular imagination. However, as Boesch cautions, the alleged diﬀ erences 
between bonobos and chimpanzees may rather be due to “the ecological condi-
tions prevailing in the populations under consideration than to interspecies diﬀ er-
ences”; moreover, fewer data are available on bonobos than on chimpanzees, so 
generalizations about the behavior of the whole species are not reliable.
Whatever primatology has to say on the matter, the bonobos’ popular attri-
butes are given great weight in Gruen’s novel. While their basic similarity to hu-
mans is stressed—at the outset, we are informed that bonobos and humans “share 
98.7 percent of their dna” (4)—they are presented as a better, utopian version 
of humanity. (It should be noted that the human genome also closely resembles 
that of frogs. While human kinship with apes has become not only accepted 
but embraced in contemporary popular culture, the more radical claim shared 
by Darwinism and posthumanist theory that even frogs—and insects, and all 
the rest—are our “cousins” may still provoke some visceral resistance.) Whereas 
the bonobos remain peaceable, playful, and loving throughout the narrative, hu-
Pr
op
ert
y o
f th
e U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
eo
rgi
a P
res
s
372 Virginia Richter
man acquisitiveness and antagonism lead to violence. Shortly after John’s visit, the 
Great Ape Language Lab is bombed by what initially appears to be animal rights 
activists. Isabel is badly hurt and disﬁ gured in the blast; the bonobos escape, are 
recaptured, and then are sold by the University of Kansas to an unknown buyer, 
on the grounds that a continuation of the experiments would constitute a hazard 
to the university’s employees. It turns out that the attack was orchestrated on 
behalf of the porn tycoon Ken Faulks, aided and abetted by Isabel’s ﬁ ancé, the 
scientist Peter Benton, a careerist and “ape torturer.” Peter is paid by Faulks to 
help set up the Ape House, a building equipped with cameras that broadcast the 
bonobos’ interactions, especially their sexual activities, to a prurient tv audience. 
While this venture initially pays oﬀ —twenty- ﬁ ve million viewers subscribe to the 
show (150)—after some time, the bonobos’ performance becomes boring despite 
the variability and frequency of their sexual engagements, and ratings drop. Ap-
parently, violence is more attractive on television than sex is, but the innately 
peaceful bonobos resist all attempts to stir up conﬂ ict among them. The sagging 
interest peaks again when the young bonobo Makena gives birth in front of the 
camera, stirring in viewers, such as John, “something . . . primal” (255)—a climax 
that eventually results in John’s acceptance of procreation: “Suddenly it all made 
perfect sense. To be able to create life with the woman he loved was a miracle of 
nature, perhaps the deepest need he’d ever felt” (277). Through his empathy with 
the simian mother, John is able to connect his own individual relationship with 
the “miracle” of creating life. The family, the site of reproduction, is thus sanctiﬁ ed 
(and the father becomes a bit like God).
While the bonobos’ sexual versatility is presented in the narrative as positive—
it contributes hugely to the peaceful cohabitation of the group—human sexual 
activity appears as strictly heterosexual and geared to reproduction. The emphasis 
on procreation explains the overall omission of homosexuality from the novel. 
The stance on sexuality that Ape House adopts is demonstrative tolerance. Within 
heterosexual parameters, variation and experimentation are endorsed, inside and 
outside of marriage, even including venal sex: a group of strippers is portrayed 
with sympathy. The novel also takes care to distance itself from the homophobia 
that is perceptible in the audience’s reactions to some of the bonobos’ practices. 
The target audience for the broadcasts—“working- class heterosexual adult human 
males” (177)—cheer female homosexual activities but feel intensely uncomfortable 
with male- to- male intimacy. This attitude is not shared by any of the novel’s sym-
pathetic ﬁ gures, who consider all of the bonobos’ activities as natural. Human ho-
mosexuality, however, simply does not occur. In contrast, Lydia in Bruno Littlemore 
has a lesbian relationship before she becomes Bruno’s lover. In Ape House, almost 
all the human protagonists, including minor characters, either ﬁ nd happiness in 
a heterosexual relationship and / or get pregnant, as do both John’s wife, Amanda, 
and the stripper Jovanka (who steals Ken Faulks’s semen and thereby metes out 
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a dose of poetic justice to the unscrupulous mastermind behind the bonobos’ 
exploitation). Counting Makena’s delivery, the novel ends with three pregnancies.
The bonobos’ versatile sexuality serves as a foil for the heteronormative nar-
ratives involving the human characters. Just as human homosexuality is tacitly 
passed over, so another, more fundamental boundary transgression goes unmen-
tioned: sexuality between species. While there is physical contact between Isabel 
and her charges—playful “roughhousing” (11)—there is never any suggestion of 
an erotic undercurrent. The bonobos’ “humanity” is repeatedly marveled at, but 
in eﬀ ect the species boundary remains carefully intact. This is emphasized in the 
novel’s conclusion. Due to Isabel and John’s joint endeavors, the bonobos are res-
cued and given a new home, a habitat designed by Isabel’s new boyfriend, Gary 
Hanson, and “protected by a double fence” (295). The fence restores the privacy 
of which the bonobos had been deprived by Faulks; it also demarcates the division 
between human and ape territory. The apes will live happily ever after in what 
amounts to a gated community protecting them from unwarranted human intru-
sion. But the fence also closes them in.
The happy ending is achieved after the human protagonists John and Isabel 
have learned the lesson of love taught by the bonobos. Their multiple quests—for 
the bonobos spirited away by Ken Faulks, for a mate and true love, and, per-
haps most important, for a sense of self- worth—are ﬁ nally successful. The overall 
harmony is sealed by a ﬁ nal kiss between man and ape, John and the bonobo 
matriarch Bonzi, sanitarily divided by a glass partition: “bonzi love visitor. 
build visitor nest. kiss kiss. She stood on the rim and pressed her lips against 
the glass. . . . John lined himself up with Bonzi’s lips and planted a big kiss on 
them” (300). Ape love human. All is well if humans develop the capacity to return 
this love, but without crossing the material and metaphorical line that divides the 
species. John will never share the nest built by Bonzi. Despite the novel’s insistence 
that bonobos and humans belong to a biological as well as mental community of 
equals, the interspecies romance is safely contained not only by the glass partition, 
but by the heteronormativity and species normativity governing the rules of erotic 
engagement. The Darwinian narrative of the dissolution of species boundaries 
is thus tacitly overturned, even while the closeness between apes and humans is 
celebrated.
g a i n i n g  a n d  l o s i n g  l a n g u a g e  i n  T H E 
E V O L U T I O N  O F  B R U N O  L I T T L E M O R E
The quest structure connects Ape House to the romance, a popular and variable 
genre loosely deﬁ ned, according to medievalist Helen Cooper, by a cluster of 
shared features. In addition to the quest, these include a concern with the hero’s 
inward thoughts, feelings, and aspirations; a concern with ideals, especially those 
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of chivalry; a belief in human perfectibility in a social context; and a happy end-
ing. While not all of the generic features are realized, Ape House shares several 
aspects with the romance beyond the heterosexual love plot with which contempo-
rary forms of the genre are frequently associated. Most important are the faith in 
human perfectibility—which both Isabel and John achieve—and the realization 
of unworldly ideals in a mundane environment. What the ideals of chivalry were 
for the medieval romance are the values surrounding interspecies relations in Ape 
House, for instance mutual respect, the recognition of the other’s personhood and 
rights, and codes of behavior such as vegetarianism. The Evolution of Bruno Little-
more is much more skeptical about the viability of such ideals. Hale’s novel does 
take up several romance features but only to subvert them; it can more properly 
be called an anti- romance (just as it is, in various ways, an anti- bildungsroman). 
The love plot ends tragically; and mutual respect across species boundaries yields 
to rejection, revilement, and ﬁ nally murder. Bruno, similarly to Gruen’s bonobos, 
ends up in a secure ape research facility, but whereas the bonobos’ new home is 
denoted as a paradisiacal, self- governed space—“the most ape- friendly habitat I’ve 
ever seen outside of a jungle,” as Isabel observes (295)—the Zastrow National 
Primate Research Center where Bruno is ﬁ nally conﬁ ned resembles both a prison 
and a madhouse.
The important theme of ape language formation is handled in a strikingly dif-
ferent way in the two novels. In Bruno Littlemore, language is not represented as 
a property that one simply “has” and can use unproblematically for the purposes 
of communication. Bruno’s progressive acquisition of language is punctuated by 
various linguistic crises, culminating in Lydia’s loss of language due to a brain tu-
mor and his own ﬁ nal perception of language as a metaphorical prison, encoding 
humans’ alienation from life and the knowledge of death rather than the message 
of love and nest building expressed by Bonzi at the end of Ape House.
The bonobos’ mastery of asl is an essentially plausible extension of the known 
language projects with great apes. In contrast, Bruno Littlemore is not content with 
oﬀ ering a probabilistic thought experiment based on existing scientiﬁ c practices; 
rather, Hale’s story of the speaking chimp, while taking  cognitive- psychological 
research with apes as its point of departure, pushes beyond the limits of realistic 
representation into the fantastic and the grotesque. The novel’s frame of refer-
ence is not only the everyday world but a long literary tradition of imagining the 
Other. This is emphasized by a web of intertextual references, most important 
to Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, Franz Kafka’s “A Report to an Academy,” 
Georg Büchner’s Woyzeck, and William Shakespeare’s The Tempest, as well as to 
Charles Darwin’s writings. This marked investment in the novel’s own literariness 
results in a diﬀ erent conceptualization of language than the one in Ape House, 
where constative and imperative uses of language prevail (for example, Bonzi uses 
a computer to order food for the Ape House). In Bruno Littlemore language is 
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not exclusively functional, directed at communication with others, but contains a 
strong self- referential and even solipsistic dimension. It is poetical in the sense of 
Roman Jakobson, that is, not concerned with content but with the message itself, 
or, in Bruno’s own term, it is musical—pure noise. Accordingly, Bruno’s linguistic 
ability is not the result of systematic teaching, but of chance, imitation, play, and 
love. He learns to speak from and has his “ﬁ rst completely reciprocal conversa-
tion” with Haywood Finch, the mentally retarded night watchman of the Uni-
versity of Chicago’s Erman Biology Center, where the young chimp is a subject in 
a series of cognitive experiments. Initially treated more like a thing than a sentient 
being, Bruno is left behind at night in a state of “panic, terror, abandonment” (57). 
From his speechless but not voiceless nocturnal rages—“I wept and screamed. I 
screamed and wept” (ibid.)—Bruno is rescued by Haywood. Perhaps precisely 
because of his mental handicap, Haywood is able to perceive what the highly 
trained scientists, seeing only the object of their research, have overlooked: the 
fellow creature. Their conversation consists of the mutual imitation of nonsensical 
sounds: “From a raw clay of nonsense we were every moment molding signiﬁ ers 
that had no signiﬁ eds, empty signs, decorative and happily meaningless words. 
Did we communicate anything? No. But language for the sake of communication 
follows language that is noise for the sake of fun—that is, music—and—this I 
truly believe—all truly beautiful language is for the sake of both: communication 
and music” (63).
Bruno’s entry into culture—his ﬁ rst word, his ﬁ rst signiﬁ er that refers to a 
signiﬁ ed—happens outside institutionalized ape language studies: at night, un-
observed, in a closed and deserted lab. The momentous scene of the ape’s ﬁ rst 
meaningful utterance goes unrecorded by science, or rather, the awe and intel-
lectual upheaval connected to the transgression of the linguistic species boundary 
is registered not, as in Ape House, by the human interlocutor but by the speaking 
ape himself. At one of their secret nightly sessions, Haywood Finch “asks” Bruno’s 
name by pointing at him:
I pointed at myself and made my ﬁ rst attempt at conscious spoken language:
“Ooh, no.”
I almost slapped my hands over my mouth—maybe I even did slap my hands over 
my mouth in astonishment at the dangerous magical noise that had just come out 
of it! It was a word! It was—it was my own name! (72)
Haywood shares Bruno’s glee at the “noise,” but it falls to Bruno to articulate 
the intellectual shock experienced when the demarcation line between apish mim-
icry and human poiesis is crossed. As Judith Butler has argued with reference to 
Louis Althusser, social existence is enabled when a being is called by a name or, 
in Althusser’s term, “interpellated” by an authority. Although Bruno is given his 
name by the scientists, he is not interpellated by them, not accorded the status 
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of a subject, because this would be unthinkable in relation to a mere animal. It is 
Haywood Finch, the most subaltern human being imaginable, who asks him his 
name and thereby allows Bruno to name himself. Haywood thus fulﬁ lls a decisive 
function in Bruno’s transition into a social existence, however liminal it is destined 
to remain: “One comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the 
address of the Other. One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in 
a prior sense, by being recognizable” (Excitable Speech, 5). The situation is tauto-
logical: prior to his ﬁ rst speech act, Bruno is not “recognizable” to the scientiﬁ c 
authorities as anything other than an animal; but without the recognition by an 
Other, he cannot speak. Haywood’s intervention is therefore crucial, albeit in itself 
insuﬃ  cient for Bruno’s eﬀ ective transformation into a subject.
As Haywood, due to his marginal social position, does not have the authority 
to aﬃ  rm Bruno’s speech act, the utterance of the name has to be repeated in the 
presence of somebody so authorized. However, this is not so easy. Bruno suc-
ceeds in making his newly acquired personhood known to Lydia, but when he 
is asked—ﬁ nally, interpellated—to repeat his speech act in the presence of the 
other scientists, and into a recorder, he remains silent: “I opened my mouth. But 
my lungs had been robbed of their oxygen. I don’t know what happened. I had 
just spoken—it was no accident, I knew that I had consciously and deliberately 
spoken my name to Lydia just a moment before. But I was speechless now. My 
diaphragm would not cooperate, it refused to provide the upward thrust of air in 
the throat necessary to bring a word into being. A demon of silence had entered 
me” (85). Bruno is betrayed by his creatureliness, by his body’s failure to cooperate 
in his conscious bid for recognition by a human Other.
Eventually, Bruno’s distinctiveness from other apes is perceived and he achieves 
what he wants: he is taken away from the lab to cohabit with Lydia. But hence-
forward, Bruno’s linguistic and social status remains precarious, his aspiration to 
become human punctured by relapses into apish silence and rage. Like his literary 
predecessors, Shakespeare’s Caliban and Kafka’s Red Peter (Bruno’s father, caught 
in the wild and brought to Chicago’s Lincoln Zoo, is named after Kafka’s speaking 
ape), Bruno is caught in a state of unhappy in- betweenness. And while he follows, 
like Tarzan, the stages of an ontogenetic recapitulation of phylogenetic evolution, 
this upward trajectory is repeatedly disrupted by external circumstances and his 
own apelike nature, until in the end a disillusioned Bruno repudiates human lan-
guage and culture, only to realize that he “cannot unlearn my humanity” (575), 
that he is trapped in the prison house of language, a condition that mirrors his 
actual existence. Bruno is literally in a  prison- like research institution while he 
is dictating his memoirs, shut away because he killed the scientist Dr. Norman 
Plumtree, Lydia’s former boss, who performed artiﬁ cial insemination—using his 
own semen—on a chimpanzee, Bruno’s sister. Bruno’s life is saved precisely by his 
in- between status: neither fully human—“I am not and have never been regarded 
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as a legal citizen of this or any nation” (570)—nor fully animal, his life is dedicated 
to science. After an only partly successful interpellation into a social existence, he 
returns to what he was in the beginning—an object of scientiﬁ c inquiry: “They’ll 
probably put my brain in a jar and test the thisness and thatness of it. And I am 
sure their scrutiny will reveal nothing” (ibid.).
One of the reasons for Bruno’s disappointment with the human condition is 
Lydia’s tragic fate. As Bruno grows up and simultaneously becomes more and 
more human—achieving language, bipedalism, and literacy; wearing clothes; and 
becoming an artist—their relationship changes, culminating in physical intimacy 
and, ﬁ nally, in Lydia’s pregnancy. But his ascent to humanity is chiastically accom-
panied by Lydia’s descent. The attractive, healthy, young, promising scientist ﬁ rst 
loses her job at the University of Chicago—partly because “project Bruno” doesn’t 
turn out as expected—and then more and more her control over her life, until 
her severe headaches are diagnosed as an untreatable tumor. The growth presses 
on the Broca’s area in her brain, resulting in an increasingly debilitating aphasia:
Lydia was out of commission. Even when she was awake, she just puttered around 
our apartment with the vacant eyes of a starving person, picking up things and put-
ting them back down, often babbling incoherently, or else remaining disturbingly 
silent. If she wanted to salt her food at the table she would point at the saltshaker 
and say, “The . . . the . . . the . . . the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the . . . “ Meaning, of 
course, “Please pass the salt.” Lydia’s silences grew longer, darker, more profound. 
Her words were leaving her. One by one the elements of her vocabulary were pack-
ing up their things and vacating their apartments in the condemned building of her 
mind. (347–48)
Lydia still has a hold on the signiﬁ ed but cannot produce the corresponding 
signiﬁ er. It is almost as if only a limited amount of language proﬁ ciency were avail-
able, and the better Bruno gets at expressing himself, the more Lydia goes into a 
decline. Sliding into poverty, dependence, and the loss of self- consciousness, she is 
brutally victimized by Christian fundamentalists incensed by her sexual relations 
with an ape and by the fact that she carries Bruno’s baby: they assault her in her 
own ﬂ at while her housemates, Bruno and her friend and former lover Tal, are 
out for a walk, and rip the fetus from her belly. Lydia is only narrowly saved from 
bleeding to death, but never fully recovers. After a long period of hospitalization, 
she succumbs to her tumor.
However, Lydia’s descent into an ultimate “vegetable” state, while inversely sym-
metrical to Bruno’s evolutionary rise, is not explicable in terms of a harsh poetic 
balance. While her case of language loss is the most extreme, the novel abounds 
with ﬁ gures, both human and simian, who are “pitifully imprisoned behind an 
opaque wall of incommunicability” (264). Even while displaying his linguistic 
virtuosity as the author of his memoirs, Bruno repudiates the bliss he experienced 
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during his language lessons with Haywood Finch, and denounces language, the 
sign of human dignity, as either an inadequate tool or the instrument of suﬀ er-
ing. Like Caliban, Bruno’s proﬁ t on learning language is that now he knows how 
to curse his mentor, humankind—and how to write novels. The celebration and 
the critique of language, as humankind’s greatest achievement and bane, hover in 
unresolved contradiction.
t h e  p r i m a t o l o g i s t ’ s  b o d y : 
r e p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  v i o l e n c e
Primatology is not only the study of apes. Apes are construed as the human Other 
that serves to delimit what we think of the human self, a self that is always gen-
dered. Not least for this reason it is signiﬁ cant that the human heroines in Ape 
House and The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore are trained primatologists. Their 
primary meeting ground with the apes is their workplace, the lab (importantly, not 
a habitat in the wild or a zoo). The lab is a heavily regulated and depersonalized 
part of a research institution. Nevertheless, the women primatologists soon cross 
the border between the institutional and the private; they become emotionally 
involved with their objects of research. Concomitantly, these women’s gendered, 
biological bodies soon become a main focus of attention. It is not only women’s re-
productive capacity that is negotiated here in relation to the Darwinian narrative, 
but also the creatureliness of their bodies, their conspicuous vulnerability, which 
links them to mortal animals and hence disturbs the religious notion of humans as, 
sole among all creatures, immortal. In this respect the novels can be linked, albeit 
tenuously, to the agenda of posthumanism, in particular its insistence—in Cary 
Wolfe’s formulation, which in turn draws on Jacques Derrida’s work on  animals—
on human embodiment in a material world. As mentioned above, however, the 
fact that it is speciﬁ cally the female body that is connected with injury, illness, and 
death as well as procreation limits the posthumanist impact of both narratives, 
since in Western dualistic thinking woman has always been aligned with nature, 
the body, and animality against the male- coded categories of culture, the mind, 
and rationality.
Language is also traditionally positioned on the male side of the dichotomy. 
Lydia’s aphasia can be seen as the epitome of woman’s exclusion from the symbolic 
order and, hence, language. However, the situation in her case is more complex 
than that. As a primatologist, she is also connected to rationality and science. As 
Bruno’s surrogate mother, she is responsible for teaching Bruno to speak following 
his initiation into language by Haywood Finch, and she functions as a mediator, 
a spokesperson, between their private world and the external world of science and 
society. For a long time, she is actively in control of her speech acts and her actions 
in a way Bruno is not. Her agency is undermined only by initially invisible and 
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ultimately uncontrollable physiological processes inside her body, the growth of a 
tumor in her brain and the growth of a baby in her womb.
As Donna Haraway has remarked, “Primatology is western discourse, and it is 
sexualized discourse.” Despite its entanglement in colonial history and a frame-
work of heroic exploration, primatology has achieved an exceptional status regard-
ing its disciplinary gender politics. Since the Second World War, women ﬁ eld re-
searchers have achieved great success, often helped in their careers by the powerful 
“father ﬁ gure” of Louis Leakey. In her seminal study Primate Visions, Haraway has 
analyzed the interaction of gender, race, and popular media within ﬁ eld studies 
on apes. Embodied by the prominent ﬁ gures of Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey, and 
Biruté Galdikas in the pages of National Geographic, in documentaries, and in 
feature ﬁ lms such as the Fossey biopic Gorillas in the Mist (1988), primatology has 
come to be perceived as a “women’s science” which, as Haraway points out, does 
not necessarily mean feminist science. In particular, Haraway critically analyzes 
the positioning of women primatologists as go- betweens on the border between 
nature and culture. The women form special bonds with apes in contrast to their 
male colleagues’ greater detachment: “apes and white people, especially women 
represented as surrogate mothers and scientists, were placed together simultane-
ously in the ‘natural’ world of the forest, sharing ad lescence and  child- rearing 
practices, and in the ‘social’ world of language studies, sharing a love for cuddly 
pets.” The gendered division of labor in ape studies still places man outside na-
ture, whereas women primatologists, in their double role as scientists and surrogate 
mothers, serve as conduits, as “highly replayed mediators at the modern boundary 
between culture and nature.” The strange duality of the woman primatologist’s 
position has been expressed by Francine Patterson, a developmental psychologist 
who taught asl to the gorilla Koko, whom she also raised from infancy: “From the 
beginning of Project Koko I had a dual role: I was a scientist attempting to teach 
a gorilla a human sign language, but I was also a mother to a one- year old infant 
with all an infant’s needs and fears.”
In Sara Gruen’s and Benjamin Hale’s novels, the narrative of the woman prima-
tologist’s closeness to (simian) nature intersects with the genre of the  human- simian 
family romance. The primatologist needs to ﬁ nd her place as both a daughter and 
a mother; this task is successful in Ape House but ultimately fails in Bruno Little-
more. Additionally, the primatologist’s gendered body becomes a site of violent 
incursions. In Lydia’s case especially, her womb is the site of struggle between 
her transgressive sexuality and the Christian fundamentalists’ desire to maintain 
the purity of humankind by violently “cleansing” the polluted female body. As I 
discuss below, this is also a struggle about words, meaning, and reading, about the 
relation between the body and language in which the female body becomes the 
medium of male inscription.
The female protagonists in both novels come from dysfunctional families and 
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ﬁ nd in their aﬃ  liation with apes a better surrogate family, thus enacting precisely 
the pattern of Freud’s family romance. While Isabel and Lydia function as mothers 
who educate and protect the apes, they are in turn “adopted” by them and ﬁ nd 
in the mixed  human- simian family the emotional warmth they lack elsewhere. In 
particular Isabel, whose mother was an alcoholic and a part- time prostitute, re-
peatedly calls the bonobos “her family” (10, 11, 90) and ﬁ nally succeeds in creating 
a home for the apes and herself: “We’ll go home soon, Bonzi. It will be a diﬀ erent 
home, but it will be a good home, and I’m going to be there. I’m never leaving 
you again” (286). Isabel’s homemaking on behalf of the bonobos—building a new, 
better Ape House with the assistance of her new lover—can be regarded as a sur-
rogate for, and perhaps a prelude to, the founding of her own reproductive family.
Isabel’s quest for a (human and simian) family of her own is interlaced with a 
parallel trajectory, which could be called the achievement of agency and comfort 
within her own body. Due to her unhappy family background, she seems insuf-
ﬁ ciently anchored in her body and, consequently, distanced and insecure. Her 
problematic relation to her body is aggravated by the injuries she sustains in the 
bombing of the Great Ape Language Lab. Although Isabel is, in contrast to Lydia, 
only a random victim of attack, the resulting disﬁ gurement is traumatic: “Isabel 
found herself looking at a complete stranger. The scalp and checks were swathed in 
gauze. The nose was broad and smashed, with an absurd nose diaper taped loosely 
beneath the oxygen piping to catch the bloody runoﬀ . Its ﬂ esh was swollen and 
blue, with specks of reddish purple. The eyes were slits between swollen pads of 
ﬂ esh and the white of one was scarlet. Trembling ﬁ ngers appeared beside her face, 
and these were indisputably hers” (44). This confrontation with her disﬁ gured 
mirror image marks the nadir of her alienation from her own body. Her visible im-
pairment is compounded by the curtailing of her communicative capacity; because 
her jaw is wired, she cannot speak and is forced to use asl, which in turn results 
in the police treating her as physically and mentally disabled: the detective “practi-
cally shouted, leaving a space between words and phrases” (45). As a witness, she 
is almost on a par with the bonobos, who are not questioned at all. Isabel’s loss of 
agency and personal rights reaches the lowest point when her picture is taken and 
published without her permission. Like the apes on reality tv, she has no privacy 
and no control over the circulation of her image. At this stage, Isabel, speechless 
and immobilized, is reduced to a passive object, almost like an animal.
However, the crisis marks a turning point in her life. Isabel progressively re-
claims her lost agency. The battle on behalf of her “family,” the endangered bono-
bos, results in her psychological recuperation alongside her physical recovery. John 
observes the diﬀ erence: “She seemed so happy and relaxed. Even on the day they’d 
met, before the bombing, there had been something reserved and anxious about 
her. There was no sign of that now. The very way she moved her body was dif-
ferent. The old Isabel would never have taken his arm” (297). Body and soul are 
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healed; the rift between them has closed. The successful emancipatory tale ﬁ nally 
joins the family romance; the new ape habitat symbolizes both Isabel’s professional 
success and her newfound private happiness.
In The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore, the opposite movement occurs: the family 
romance is replaced by the erotic romance, which in turn leads to tragedy. From 
being Lydia’s adopted “baby” (28), Bruno graduates to become her lover, and ﬁ nally 
makes her pregnant. This interspecies transgression is conceptualized in Bruno’s 
retrospective commentary as both deviance and perversion (42) and as emotional 
healing—for Lydia, who lost her husband and unborn child, and for himself, who 
was separated from his family of origin: “In a past life, Lydia had been robbed of 
a son and a lover. And I, Bruno, eventually gave her back both. So yes, obviously 
there was a sense of some deep- seated and dangerous taboo that our relationship 
violated. But this taboo was not bestiality—it was incest” (193). Bruno presents 
us with a Darwinian narrative of kinship and evolution that unfolds through his 
becoming human, and with a Freudian, oedipal narrative of boundary transgres-
sion within the family. Positioned between excessive exogamy and incest, there is 
no social place for Bruno and Lydia’s love. However, the relationship is ﬂ awed in 
another respect as well. The ﬁ rst time Bruno penetrates Lydia she is unconscious, 
knocked out by the strong sleeping pills she uses during her migraines. Bruno’s 
trespass constitutes what Lydia herself will later call rape, although she comes to 
accept the situation and, according to Bruno, soon returns his passion. However, 
we never gain insight into her view of things apart from the dialogue reported 
verbatim, to which her contributions become less and less frequent. In contrast to 
Isabel, Lydia is successively deprived of her agency by her illness and dependency 
on heavy medication, by Bruno’s ruthless and immature pursuit of his gratiﬁ ca-
tion, by his narrative that ultimately frames her as a silenced object, and ﬁ nally, by 
the violence done to her.
Lydia’s pregnancy is discovered when she is hospitalized on account of her brain 
tumor. The concomitant exposure of Bruno’s paternity is instantly passed to the 
media, with the result that religious protesters gather in front of Lydia and Bruno’s 
apartment house, “chanting their idiocies outside of our apartment all day and 
night” (332). Despite Lydia’s debilitated state after her brain surgery, the Christian 
fundamentalists show no mercy. Shouting incessantly through a megaphone, the 
protesters call Lydia “the whore of Babylon, calling [Bruno] an abomination be-
fore God and man, asserting that there lived in her belly the child of Satan” (335). 
While Bruno invokes the narrative of genetic closeness—“Humans and chimps 
have more chromosomes in common than a donkey and a horse” (330–31)—to 
justify the relationship as “only natural” (331), the protesters see it as a desecration 
of the divine will to keep the species separate. The conﬂ ict thus starts as a war 
of words in which the protesters set up Lydia, Bruno, and their unborn child as 
creatures outside the pale of humanity, and therefore killable. The Old Testament 
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furnishes the protesters with the powerful vocabulary that cancels out the interspe-
cies lovers’ social existence, and thus their right to be protected from harm. The 
counternarrative that science could provide, precisely the Darwinian narrative of 
the  human- simian relationship, cannot at this stage be uttered, because the repre-
sentative of science, the primatologist Lydia, cannot speak, and Bruno, a juvenile 
animal and noncitizen, cannot make himself heard. Bruno’s apology for their love 
can be uttered only in retrospect, through the dictation of his autobiography.
As Kevin W. Saunders has argued, hate speech is closely connected to a concep-
tualization of sexual acts as obscene; obscenity in turn is deeply rooted in mono-
theism: “Once God becomes a singular, nonsexual being, showing humans in 
sexual acts is depicting humans as on the animal side of a divine / animal divide.” 
In Western monotheistic culture, sex deﬁ nes the chasm between the divine and 
the animal; therefore, “obscenity is not really about sex” but “about the place-
ment of humankind in the hierarchy of the animal.” Unsurprisingly, Darwin’s 
negation of a clear separation between the diﬀ erent species and the concomitant 
repositioning of humankind, from the divine to the animal side of the divide, 
only served to heighten prevalent anxieties about human sexuality. According to 
Saunders, the increase in obscenity prosecutions from the late nineteenth century 
through the ﬁ rst half of the twentieth in the United States was directly related to 
the growing public awareness of, and resistance to, Darwinism: “It is as though 
society expressed itself in denial of Darwin’s claims by proscribing the depiction of 
humans engaged in animal or such nondivine activities.” The fact that Lydia and 
Bruno not only had sex but actually succeeded in merging their gametes thus con-
ﬁ rms the Christian fundamentalists’ worst fears: humans are animals. The Judeo- 
Christian promise of dominion over nature is negated by Darwin’s assertion that 
man is part of nature. This is Bruno’s conclusion too: “And they hated us because 
of this: because here, swimming in a pouch of ﬂ uid in Lydia’s lower abdomen, 
was living, unassailable proof of human evolution” (336). The Darwinian narra-
tive literally comes true in this union. The protesters’ nonverbal act that follows 
upon their hate- ﬁ lled speech acts is designated to undo this “becoming ﬂ esh” of 
Darwin’s word, by in turn literalizing their reading of the Bible. The injunction 
taken from Leviticus 20:16—“And if a woman lies with any animal, you shall kill 
both the woman and the animal. They must be put to death. Their blood shall be 
upon them”—which Bruno ﬁ nds smeared on the wall of Lydia’s bedroom (366), 
has been acted out, at least in its ﬁ rst part, on Lydia’s body.
In Excitable Speech, Judith Butler, following J. L. Austin, distinguishes between 
hate speech as an illocutionary speech act that performs the injury done to the 
addressee at the very moment of utterance, and hate speech as a perlocutionary 
speech act that describes an injury or produces one as a consequence (18). In the 
second model, which Butler advocates, there is a time lag between the utterance 
and its eﬀ ect; this allows the addressee to rearticulate the original utterance and 
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thereby to deﬂ ect its injurious eﬀ ect. Bruno’s entire autobiography can be regarded 
as such an attempt at rearticulating the fundamentalists’ hate speech and, more 
broadly, the anthropocentric narrative that denies him recognition as a being of 
equal value. However, in Lydia’s case, hate speech is swiftly followed by an act of 
hatred, and the injury she sustains cannot be rewritten and undone, partly because 
she was deprived of speech and thus of agency even before this deed. Her body is 
reduced to a mere site of struggle, ravaged by the conﬂ ict between the biblical and 
the evolutionary narratives about men and apes. While the two speech acts, the 
fundamentalists’ “reiteration” of Leviticus and Bruno’s autobiographical assertion 
of his equivalence with humans, are certainly not homologous, they have one as-
pect in common: Lydia has no active share in the construction of either narrative.
Darwin is still very present on the American scene. The conﬂ ict epitomized by the 
Scopes trial—evolution versus Genesis—continues to inﬂ uence public debates 
and political activism, much more so in the United States than in the public 
sphere of most European countries. However, negotiations of the Darwinian nar-
rative have become vastly more complex since the days of Bryan’s and Darrow’s 
heated exchanges at Dayton. Research in genetics, primatology, and evolutionary 
psychology has provided ample evidence for the close kinship between human and 
nonhuman primates, and all animals. The ecological movement similarly empha-
sizes the interconnectedness of all living beings, and the devastating impact the 
wrong choices of the dominant species may have on all the others—a theme taken 
up in several contemporary novels, including Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom (2010) 
and T. C. Boyle’s When the Killing’s Done (2011). But advances in our knowledge of 
nature do not signify closure; on the contrary, the current proliferation of ﬁ ction 
on animals, nature, and science suggests that this nexus provides us more than ever 
with food for imaginative thought experiments.
The two novels discussed here are further examples of the topicality of many 
questions raised by Darwin and those working in his tradition. Ape House and 
The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore address in particular the issue of ape language 
acquisition and the resultant question: What would happen if experiments really 
produced apes who are linguistically humans’ equals? If one takes a closer look, 
the answer is rather unsettling. Even in Gruen’s determinedly cheerful novel, the 
bonobos end up in conﬁ nement; Hale’s speaking chimp, Bruno, fares even worse. 
Since apes have traditionally served as ﬁ gures of reﬂ ection on the human condi-
tion, their denial of freedom in both novels suggests that language is not a boon 
elevating the human species above nature, but rather a manacle that keeps humans 
locked in a prison of their own making. This pessimistic view is largely obliterated 
in Ape House, but Hale’s darker tale joins the literary tradition, from Shakespeare 
to Kafka, that skeptically challenges the belief in the transparency of language as 
well as the narrative of human ascent.
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The speaking ape is not the only ﬁ gure through which the vulnerability and 
precariousness of the human status is explored in the novels. It is signiﬁ cant that 
in both cases, the ape’s counterpart is a woman primatologist. Drawing on the 
complex positioning of women as mediators between nature and culture in real- 
life primatology, which has been analyzed by Donna Haraway, both novels depict 
their female protagonists as go- betweens with a special emotional and physical 
connection to apes. In consequence, these women’s hold on a socially secured sub-
ject status is shown to be much more tenuous, much more vulnerable than that of 
the various powerful male ﬁ gures in the novels. This precarious status makes the 
women’s position converge with that of the animals, to the point of experiencing 
a similar helplessness and subjection at the hands of scientiﬁ c, medical, and penal 
institutions.
The fantasy of the interspecies romance is played out in these  women- ape re-
lationships, but while its transgressive potential is rendered innocuous through a 
carefully constructed heteronormative framework in Ape House, the  cross- species 
transgression is ﬂ aunted in The Evolution of Bruno Littlemore. Does this mean that 
Hale’s novel, with its formal aﬃ  nity with postmodernism, comes closer to fulﬁ ll-
ing the mandate of posthumanism, namely to disrupt the logic of the traditional 
narratives of anthropocentrism and speciesism? I w uld argue that it falls short of 
this—possibly unattainable—goal. Despite its explicit alignment with the Dar-
winian narrative, and despite its rhetorical ﬁ reworks that paradoxically support a 
notion of language as a deﬁ cient prosthesis of the human animal, Bruno Littlemore 
remains committed to a fundamentally anthropocentric and androcentric narra-
tive. The true Other we encounter in this novel is not the  almost- human ape, but 
the dying Lydia. But the novel ultimately shies away from imagining her naked 
life, divested of consciousness and dignity. Instead, we get Bruno’s self- involved 
memoir, which consistently presents Lydia as an object, ﬁ rst of desire, then of pity. 
To look at a suﬀ ering, silenced woman from a male vantage point does not exactly 
constitute a break with traditional gender patterns. Despite its formal sophistica-
tion, Hale’s novel misses the chance to explore Otherness at the interstices between 
the human and the animal, between social existence constituted by language and 
the mortal body beyond language.
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